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A structural vector autoregression (VAR) model shows that external shocks are 
important in driving economic fluctuations in Pakistan and their importance has 
increased since September 11, 2001. The primary source of external shocks is 
foreign remittances, while foreign output has a limited effect.  Keeping fixed 
external factors, an exogenous real exchange rate depreciation shock lowers 
output—a positive effect on real net exports (largely resulting from import 
compression rather export expansion)—is more than offset by a decline in 
domestic demand. The absence of common shocks with major trading partners, 
the importance of remittances, conventional expansionary effects on the trade 
balance following a real currency depreciation, and only limited evidence that 
credibility of anti-inflationary policy would improve with a currency peg support 
greater exchange rate flexibility.  However, the rather large contractionary effects 
of real exchange rate depreciation on domestic demand suggest that greater 
exchange rate flexibility could destabilize aggregate output.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the sources of economic fluctuations in Pakistan using a 
structural vector autoregression (VAR) methodology. Specifically, we determine 
the extent to which changes in output, inflation, and real exchange rate are driven 
by external shocks and the role that real exchange rate shocks play in driving the 
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economy. The primary goal of the analysis is to highlight the implications of the 
results for choice of exchange rate regime in Pakistan.1
 
It is now generally well-understood that the traditional literature on the choice of 
exchange rate regimes might be only of limited relevance to developing countries 
because of the special problems they face.2 One such problem is that exchange 
rate depreciations are often contractionary rather than expansionary in these 
countries.3  This means that one key advantage of floating exchange rates—that of 
providing an appropriate adjustment mechanism to various kinds of shocks—is 
negated; exchange rate flexibility with “contractionary devaluations” could 
actually destabilize, rather than stabilize, the economy. 
 
On the other hand, there is also a near-consensus that should these countries 
decide to peg their currencies, the only viable pegs would be to hard currencies 
like the dollar, euro, or the yen.  And this means that these countries are unlikely 
to satisfy the criterion of having common shocks with their potential anchor 
currency countries. 
 
So, under these special circumstances, what should developing countries do: fix or 
float? There is no clear-cut answer. There is an argument for fixing that, since 
these countries do not gain much from exchange rate flexibility, they might as 
well fix to have a nominal anchor for inflation and increase credibility of anti-
inflation policy more credible. But then there is a counterargument also: exchange 
rate depreciations have been contractionary in the historical record of developing 
countries only because these depreciations have been dominated by forced exits 
from non-viable pegs in crisis times.4 Therefore, contractionary devaluations do 
not indicate that exchange rate flexibility is destabilizing but rather that soft (or 
adjustable) pegs do not work.5
                                                 
1 This is the shortened version of the paper Ahmed, Ara, and Hyder (2005), which contains more 
details and additional results. 
2 The classic works of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) on optimal currency 
areas represent the traditional literature. 
3 The literature on contractionary devaluations dates back several decades and has continued to 
expand in recent years. See, for example, Diaz Alejandro (1963), Cooper (1971), Krugman and 
Taylor (1978), Edwards (1989), Lizondo and Montiel (1989), Agenor (1991), Kamin and Klau 
(1996), Kamin and Rogers (2000), Ahmed et al (2002), and Ahmed (2003). 
4 This argument was one motivation behind Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) introducing a new category 
of exchange rate regime of “freely falling” for very high inflation, frequent depreciation episodes in 
their “natural” classification scheme.  
5 There is also a related debate in the literature about the bipolar view—free floats and hard fixes 
being the only sustainable option—versus the view that intermediate regimes are possible and even, 
in some cases, desirable. For the arguments made on the two sides of this debate, see, for example, 
Williamson (1996), Frankel (1999), and Fischer (2001). 
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Among the key considerations for a developing country in deciding to fix or to 
float would, therefore, be: how important are external shocks overall, the extent to 
which the country departs from the important traditional criterion of having 
common shocks with the potential anchor country, and whether exchange rate 
depreciations are contractionary or expansionary. 
 
If devaluations are contractionary, the channels through which this is occurring 
can be relevant too. In the older literature on contractionary devaluations, the key 
channel emphasized was that since key inputs had to be imported, devaluation 
could worsen the trade balance instead of improving it. The modern literature 
highlights reasons such as currency mismatches on domestic balance sheets.6  In 
this situation, currency depreciation increases the domestic currency value of 
domestic liabilities, which has a negative effect on wealth and, therefore, 
consumption and investment. Thus, domestic demand can fall as a result of 
currency depreciation. There can be indirect effects as well, whereby devaluation 
leads to loss of investor confidence and lack of access to international capital 
markets, with adverse consequences again for domestic absorption.7 The 
implications of fixing versus floating can be different depending on the reasons 
why devaluations might be contractionary. 
 
In light of the above discussion, in this paper we specifically focus on the 
following questions with respect to Pakistan’s economy: (1) How important are 
external shocks (terms of trade shocks, shocks to outputs/incomes of major trading 
partners, and foreign remittance shocks) in driving economic fluctuations? (2) Are 
exchange rate depreciations contractionary or expansionary? (3) What are the 
channels through which exchange rate changes affect the economy and how 
important is their effect relative to other factors? (4) What are the implications of 
the results for the choice of exchange rate regimes?8
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a selective 
review of previous findings for Pakistan on the effects of remittances and 
exchange rate changes on the economy; section 3 lays out our empirical 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000). 
7 This leads developing countries to have a rational “fear of floating” as argued by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) and Hausmann, et al. (2001), for example. 
8Most empirical evidence from developing countries on the performance of economies under 
different exchange rate regimes is of the cross-country variety; see, for example, Husain, et al. 
(2005). Husain (2004) develops a template based on a large number of relevant criteria, which can 
be applied to individual countries. Here we focus in detail on just two key criteria for Pakistan—the 
importance of external shocks and whether devaluations are contractionary or expansionary. 
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methodology; section 4 presents our empirical findings and provides an 
interpretation of the results; and section 5 concludes them. 
 
2. Review of Previous Results 
 
The previous related work for Pakistan has focused on the role of external factors 
(in particular their relationship with exchange rate movements), effects of changes 
in exchange rates on real variables and implications for choice of exchange rate 
regimes, and the relationship between exchange rates and prices. 
 
Khan (1986) considered the impact of trade terms, real GNP of industrial 
countries, real interest rates in international capital markets, and capital flows on 
Pakistan’s real exchange rate over the period 1977 to 1984. He concluded that the 
effect of these external factors on real exchange rate movements was often 
contrary to that predicted by the theory. 
 
Ahmed and Ali (1999) used a simultaneous equation framework to trace the 
pattern and speed of adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and domestic price 
level in response to domestic and external shocks using data for the period 1982:II 
to 1996:IV. They considered shock to money supply and real output as domestic 
shocks and shock to export prices, import prices, and foreign exchange reserves as 
external shocks. Comparing the responses of prices and exchange rates to various 
shocks, they also concluded that, in the short run, the price level response to 
shocks was not in the direction that would offset the exchange rate response and 
leave the real exchange rate unchanged, but in the long run it was. Thus, they 
surmised that purchasing power parity (PPP) did not hold in the short run. 
 
Several researchers have remittances from abroad to be an important influence on 
the Pakistan economy. For example, Nishat and Bilgrami (1991), using a standard 
Keynesian macro model and applying a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation technique over the period 1960 to 1988, computed the remittance 
output multiplier to be about 2.5—that is, a Rs. 1 million increase in remittances 
would increase GNP by about Rs. 2.5 million, according to their results. 
Moreover, Haque and Montiel (1992) show that growth in workers’ remittances 
substantially appreciated the real exchange rate over the period 1982 to 1991. 
Specifically, workers’ remittances and official transfers explained 80 percent of 
the variation observed in the effective real exchange rate over the period. Khan’s 
paper, discussed earlier, also found that remittances play a critical role in 
movements of the balance of payments and the real exchange rate. 
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The traditional literature on whether currency depreciation improves the trade 
balance has focused on whether the Marshall-Lerner stability condition is 
satisfied. Hassan and Khan (1994) concluded that the Marshall-Lerner stability 
condition was satisfied, using data over the period 1972 to 1991. By contrast, 
Khan and Aftab (1995), using a somewhat different sample period of 1983 to 
1993, concluded that the Marshall-Lerner condition was not satisfied. They also 
examined disaggregated export data, again finding little support that devaluation 
improves export performance. Using data disaggregated by Pakistan’s four major 
trading partners, Akhtar and Malik (2000) concluded that real devaluation was 
likely to improve Pakistan’s trade balance with the United Kingdom and Japan but 
not with the United States or Germany. 
 
The error-correction model of Aftab and Aurangzeb (2002) supports the existence 
of a J-curve in the short run, whereby the trade balance first deteriorates in the first 
two quarters following currency depreciation but then improves. Results in 
Rehman and Afzal (2003) are also consistent with a J-curve, with a negative effect 
on the trade balance of exchange rate depreciation for about six quarters and then 
turning positive. 
 
There seems to be only very limited work done in the case of Pakistan on the 
output effects of exchange rate changes and on the choice and consequences of 
different types of exchange rate regimes. Khan (1986) finds some merit in a policy 
of some flexibility of the exchange, arguing that this enhances the ability of the 
authorities to adjust to a variety of external shocks, which are important for the 
economy. Ahmed (1992) studied the determinants of the nominal exchange rate 
since the advent of managed float in 1982 to 1987, using monthly data. He found 
that in the long run, movements in the Rupee appeared to offset the relative 
inflation differential between Pakistan and its major trading partners, consistent 
with the targeting of a constant real exchange rate.9
 
Most studies for Pakistan do not seem to find a high pass-through from exchange 
rate changes to prices. Studies finding little evidence of substantial pass-through 
include Haque and Montiel (1992), Siddiqui and Akhtar (1999), and Choudri and 
Khan (2002). One study that appears to be an exception and finds stronger 
evidence of pass-through over the period 1982 to 1996 is Ahmed and Ali (1999). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Nabi (1997) also discussed the management of the exchange rate as a principle tool of trade policy. 
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3. Empirical Model and Methodology 
 
In order to isolate the causal influence of exchange rate shocks on the economy, it 
is important to control for key external factors that might influence both the real 
exchange rate and domestic output and inflation. The key external factors directly 
controlled for in this study are terms of trade, output/incomes of trading partners 
(foreign output), and remittances from abroad. 
 
The empirical methodology is to estimate a six-variable structural vector 
autoregression (VAR).10  A structural VAR is basically a dynamic simultaneous 
equation model. Of the six variables we consider, three (the terms of trade, foreign 
output, and remittances) are determined only by external factors and labeled 
“external variables” while the remaining three (real exchange rate, output, and 
inflation) are influenced by domestic factors in addition to external factors, and 
are labeled “domestic variables”. 
 
Structural VAR 
 
Specifically, we estimate the following system of structural equations: 
 
1
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where X refers to the vector of stationary variables in the model, A is the matrix of 
contemporaneous interactions between the endogenous variables, Bj’s are matrices 
representing lagged effects with being matrix polynomials in the 
lag operator, and u  is a vector of i.i.d. structural disturbances with covariance 
matrix D, which is diagonal. Intercept terms are included in the empirics but have 
been omitted here for the sake of convenience.  
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It will be useful to partition X into “external” and “domestic” variables along the 
lines discussed earlier and also to partition the structural disturbances 
correspondingly. Thus, 
 
 
 
 
10 This follows the approach taken by Ahmed (2003) for a panel of Latin American countries. 
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where the external stationary variables–represented by X1–are the rate of change of 
the terms of trade (∆tot), foreign output growth (∆fy), the growth rate of 
remittances from abroad (∆rm) and the domestic stationary variables–represented 
by X2–are the rate of depreciation of the real effective exchange rate (∆rer), 
domestic output growth (∆y), and domestic inflation (∆p).11  The vector ε 
represents the vector of external shocks (the terms of trade, foreign output, and 
remittance shocks, respectively); and the vector η represents the vector of 
domestic shocks (a domestic real exchange rate shock, a domestic output shock, 
and a domestic price level shock, respectively)–i.e. after accounting for the 
influence of the external shocks on these variables.  
 
It is well-known that the assumptions that the fundamental economic disturbances 
in the vector u are i.i.d. and, therefore, have a diagonal covariance matrix do not 
fully identify structural models like Equation (1). To meaningfully analyze the 
effects of various shocks, further identification restrictions are needed. We place 
coefficient restrictions on the A and B matrices shown below: 
 
11 12
21 22
1 0 0 0 0 0
* 1 0 0 0 0
* * 1 0 0 0
* * * 1 0 0
* * * * 1 0
* * * * * 1
A A
A A A
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞≡ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎟
                                                
    (3) 
 
 
 
11 Unit root tests conducted using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test suggested that a VAR 
with all variables in growth rates was a more appropriate choice than a VAR with all variables in log 
deviations from trend. 
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   (4) 
 
where an asterisk denotes that the coefficient is unrestricted. 
 
Given that Pakistan can be considered a small open economy, the external 
variables are assumed to be exogenously given, which is reflected in A12 and 
B(L)12 being null matrices. Note that this makes the system block recursive. 
 
Among the external variables, it is assumed that the contemporaneous direction of 
causality goes from terms of trade to foreign output to remittances, which means 
that A11 is lower-triangular.12 Remittances can be expected to be influenced by 
conditions prevailing in the countries from which they are being sent, but are 
unlikely to in turn affect those conditions.  This is consistent with the above causal 
ordering and also implies that B(L)11 =0. 
 
Within the domestic variables, the contemporaneous causal ordering is assumed to 
go from the real exchange rate to domestic output to the domestic price level, 
which implies a lower triangular A22. Since prices are usually sticky in the short 
run, putting the price level last in the causal ordering seems appropriate. However, 
it is more controversial what the direction of contemporaneous causality is 
between the real exchange rate and output. Certainly, changes in exchange rate 
policy, which could be one source of domestically driven shocks to the real 
exchange rate, can affect output. However, some domestic shocks, such as supply 
shocks of fiscal shocks, can also affect both output and the real exchange rate. 
Since, asset markets typically react faster, the exchange rate is likely to respond to 
these shocks faster than output. Hence, we put the real exchange rate ahead of 
output in the contemporaneous causal ordering—feedback from output changes to 
real exchange rate changes with a lag is, of course, allowed.  
 
 
12 Note that the residuals of the reduced-form equations for the external variables revealed very little 
pair-wise correlation with each other.  This means that, in practice, the results are not very sensitive 
to alternative contemporaneous causal orderings of the external variables. 
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Reduced-form VAR and Identification 
 
The structural VAR given in Equation (1) cannot be directly estimated but must be 
retrieved from the reduced form of the system. The relationship between the 
structural VAR and its reduced form can be seen by pre-multiplying Equation (1) 
by A-1 to yield: 
 
1 1
1( ) ( )t t t t 1 tX A B L X A u L X v
− −
−= + ≡ Γ − +
1 1( ) [( )( ) '] ( )t t t t t t
    (5) 
 
This is the reduced form of the system, which can be estimated by applying 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The relationship between the covariance matrix of 
the structural disturbances (D) and that of the reduced-form residuals (Ω) can be 
written as: 
 
' 1 1 1 ' 1' '   (6) E v v E A u A u E A u u A A DA− − − − − −≡ Ω = = =
 
where E is the expectations operator. Identifying the structural model from the 
estimated reduced-form Equation (5) thus involves finding an A matrix such that 
Ω = A-1D A-1’ where D is diagonal. This process does not, in general, yield a 
unique A, which is another way of saying that a simultaneous equation system 
cannot be retrieved from its reduced form without additional restrictions (e.g. 
exclusion restrictions). Our postulated exclusion restrictions discussed earlier 
imply a lower triangular A, which is enough to make A unique. 
 
4. Results 
 
In this section, we first describe the data and its sources. Then we discuss the 
properties of the identified structural economic disturbances and present and 
interpret the impulse responses, variance decompositions, and historical 
decompositions using the structural VAR model retrieved according to the 
procedure described above. This is followed by evidence on the channels of 
transmission of exchange rate changes. Finally, the implications for choice of 
exchange rate regime in Pakistan are discussed. 
 
Data 
 
The terms of trade are the ratio of unit value of exports to the unit value of 
imports. Foreign output is computed as an export-weighted index of the real GDP 
of Pakistan’s 10 major export markets. Foreign remittances are total remittances 
coming into Pakistan from all countries abroad measured in US dollars. The real 
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effective exchange rate is a trade-weighted, CPI-based real exchange rate 
expressed as units of domestic goods that have to be given up to get one unit of 
the foreign good. Thus measured, a rise in the real exchange rate implies a real 
depreciation of the Pakistani rupee. Domestic output is real GDP measured at 
market prices and the price level is the consumer price index. Real Exports and 
imports are taken from the national income accounts and thus represent exports 
and imports of final goods. Finally, domestic absorption is defined as real GDP 
less net exports, and thus represents the sum of real private and government 
consumption and investment. The sources of the domestic data are Economic 
Survey, Government of Pakistan (various issues) and the international data needed 
to compute foreign output and the effective real exchange rate are taken from 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Economic disturbances  
 
We first estimate a block recursive six-variable reduced-form VAR for Pakistan—
the system in Equation (5) above—using annual data from fiscal year 1976-77 to 
2004-05. Based on statistical criteria, an initial lag length of 3 is selected for the 
VAR. However, with six variables and 3 lags, one does not have many degrees of 
freedom left for the equations for domestic variables, which contain all six 
variables. Therefore, we use statistical criteria to further restrict the reduced-form 
system by first testing and placing zero restrictions when coefficients were not 
found to be statistically significant. 
 
After estimating the restricted reduced-form, the structural model given in 
Equation (1) is retrieved, utilizing the identification restrictions and procedure 
described in section 3. This yields the fundamental structural disturbances of 
interest that are orthogonal to each other by construction. These fundamental 
innovations, together with their standard deviations, are shown in Figure 1. Note 
that the volatility of the fundamental output and price shocks, and to some extent 
of the real exchange rate shocks, appears to have increased since about 1990. This 
suggests that domestic shocks impinging on the economy have, on average, been 
bigger in size in the second part of the sample period. 
 
Among the external shocks, both terms of trade and remittances shocks are quite 
volatile. Moreover, remittances shocks appear to have increased in volatility since 
the events of September 11, 2001—notice the large positive shock subsequent to 
the tragedy—while the volatility of foreign output shocks has decreased since 
about the mid-1980s. 
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Impulse responses (IRs)  
 
The IRs present the dynamic responses of the variables to the fundamental 
economic disturbances plotted against the number of years that have elapsed since 
the shock occurred.13
 
The IRs to a one-standard deviation terms of trade shock (which represents 
roughly a 10 percentage point increase in its growth rate) are shown in Figure 2. 
The dashed lines represent 1.67 standard-error bands (roughly 90-percent 
confidence intervals).14 Responses of the growth rates as well as log-levels of all 
the variables are shown; the latter are obtained by cumulating the IRs of the 
growth rates and can be interpreted as the percent deviation of the levels of the 
variables from baseline, plotted over the number of years that have elapsed since 
the shock. Note that since the log-levels are non-stationary variables, the standard-
error bands of their responses will naturally widen over the horizon. The results on 
the terms of trade shock are striking in that this shock does not appear to have any 
statistically significant effect on the real exchange rate, output, and consumer 
prices in Pakistan. 
 
Figure 3 plots the IRs of a shock to a weighted-average of the outputs of our major 
export markets. A one standard-deviation shock amounts to a rise of about 3½ 
percentage points in the foreign growth rate. The only significant response is that 
of the real exchange rate, which shows a cumulative depreciation of about 3½ 
percent, on balance, after three years relative to the baseline. This result is 
consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson effect if the rise in foreign output relative 
to domestic output reflects, in part at least, to an increase in foreign productivity 
relative to domestic productivity. Also, as foreign economies’ growth increases, 
more remittances tend to come in from them (about a 20 percent increase in 
remittances relative to baseline after 3 years); although large, this response has a 
high standard error and is not statistically significant. There is no significant 
spillover effect to domestic output from the foreign output shock. 
 
In contrast to the other external shocks, an exogenous shock to foreign remittances 
has rather large effects on Pakistan’s economy. As shown in Figure 4, a one 
standard-deviation shock of about 30 percentage points to the growth rate of 
remittances causes domestic output growth to rise by ¾ percentage points each 
year, two and three years later.  After three years, there is a cumulative increase in 
                                                 
13 They are obtained by inverting the structural VAR to obtain its moving-average representation 
using RATS. 
14 Standard errors for the impulse responses and variance decompositions (shown later) were 
computed using Monte Carlo simulations with 5000 replications. 
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output of about 1½ percent. This shock also causes a cumulative real appreciation 
of the Pakistani rupee of about 5 percent after four years. The strong inflow of 
remittances does not appear to raise domestic inflation, though. 
 
Finally, Figure 5 depicts the IRs to an exogenous real exchange rate depreciation 
shock. Since the effects of external shocks have been kept fixed separately, the 
exogenous real exchange rate depreciation shock can be regarded as domestically-
induced and possibly policy-driven. A one standard-deviation shock in this case is 
roughly a 3 percentage point increase in the rate of depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Note that after a statistically insignificant increase in output growth 
on impact, after a year output growth falls by about half a percentage point and 
this effect is statistically significant. The level of output goes below baseline after 
a year and stays below for two years. Thus, real exchange rate depreciations tend 
to be somewhat contractionary rather than expansionary in the case of Pakistan, 
consistent with the experience of many other developing countries.15 There is also 
some pass-through effect to prices, with the inflation rate rising in response to the 
real exchange rate depreciation, leading a cumulative effect of nearly 2 percent on 
the price level. 
 
Variance decompositions 
 
How much do the external and domestic shocks contribute both as a group and 
individually to economic fluctuations in Pakistan? This depends not just on the 
magnitude of the response when a shock of a given size occurs, but also how often 
and, on average, what size shocks hit the economy. This question can be answered 
by considering the variance decompositions, which measure the percentage of the 
forecast error variances at various forecast horizons that are attributable to each of 
the individual shocks or a group of shocks. These are presented in Tables 1-3, 
along with their computer-simulated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
As shown in Table 1, at a one-year forecast horizon, only about 20 percent of the 
forecast error variance of the change in the real exchange rate can be accounted 
for by external shocks, but this rises to 60 percent for a 3-year horizon. Thus, both 
external and domestic shocks appear to be important for real exchange rate 
fluctuations, which is plausible. 
 
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that at a one-year to two-year forecast 
horizon, the bulk of the forecast error variance of domestic output growth (about 
                                                 
15 See Ahmed et al (2002) and Ahmed (2003) for some evidence for other developing countries and 
a comparison of industrial countries with developing countries in this respect.  
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75 percent to 80 percent) is explained by domestic shocks. However, external 
shocks become very important at the three-year horizon, accounting for roughly 
half of the forecast error-variance; remittance shocks alone explain about 20 
percent of the error variance. Real exchange rate shocks are also an important 
determinant of output fluctuations; their contribution to the forecast error variance 
of output growth peaks at 23 percent for a two-year forecast horizon and is in the 
neighborhood of 10 percent at other forecast horizons. 
 
External shocks are also important in the variance decompositions of inflation at a 
greater than one-year horizon, as shown in Table 3, although not as important as 
for output. About 35 percent of the error variance of the inflation rate at a three-
year horizon can be explained by external shocks, but real exchange rate shocks 
explain only up to about 10 percent of the forecast error variance of inflation  
 
Historical decompositions: Evidence on the importance of post-Sep 11, 2001 
shocks 
 
Casual empiricism suggests that influence of external shocks on the Pakistani 
economy has increased substantially following the events of September 11, 2001. 
We can examine this issue more formally by looking at the historical 
decompositions. Unlike the variance decompositions, which provide a breakdown 
of the unconditional forecast error variances, the historical decompositions give us 
the breakdown of the contribution of shocks over a specific period. Specifically, 
an initial period is chosen and baseline forecasts are made based on data available 
up to that period. The contributions of the different shocks to the deviation of 
actual values from the baseline path thus computed constitute the historical 
decompositions. 
 
Using data up to 2000-01 (the fiscal year immediately prior to the one in which 
September 11, 2001 falls) to make the baseline forecasts, historical 
decompositions for domestic output growth for the fiscal years 2001-02 (labeled 
2002) through 2004-05 (labeled 2005) are shown in Figure 6. Note that in 2005 
the actual growth rate of real GDP at market prices was 7.8 percent, whereas the 
baseline forecast in the absence of any shocks after 2001 would have been 3.4 
percent. Once we add the influence of the three external shocks, we get quite a bit 
closer to the actual growth rate; for example, in 2005, growth would have been 6.2 
percent if only the external shocks had hit the economy (second panel). Thus all 
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the shocks taken together appear to have been very important in driving 
fluctuation in real GDP growth over this period.16  
 
The third panel indicates that clearly the main external influence since 2001 has 
been shocks to remittances; with remittance shocks alone, the growth rate in 2004-
05 would have been 6.3 percent, which is even slightly closer to actual growth 
than with all the external shocks taken together. The results indicate that growth 
would have been roughly 2½ percentage points less in each of FY2004 and 
FY2005 had remittances shocks since 2001 not impinged on the economy. 
 
Channels of transmission  
 
The results discussed thus far do not tell us whether currency depreciations are 
contractionary because the trade balance deteriorates in response, instead of 
improving, or whether domestic demand falls, or both. The natural way to study 
this would be to augment our VAR system to include trade variables and domestic 
absorption. But this is not feasible here as the annual data are available only since 
about 1975 or so, and a larger VAR system will quickly run into degrees of 
freedom problem. Instead, therefore, we examine the issue by replacing the output 
variable in our VAR system by domestic absorption (the sum of private and 
government investment and consumption), real exports, and real imports in turn. 
 
The IRs to a real exchange rate shock from each of these three alternative models 
are presented in Figures 7-9. Figure 7 shows the strong contractionary effects of 
real currency depreciation on domestic absorption are much bigger than the 
contractionary effects on output presented earlier. Specifically, a one standard-
deviation shock to the rate of change real exchange rate (which is still about a 3 
percentage point shock) lowers domestic absorption growth by about 0.2 
percentage points on impact and about ¾ of a percentage point a year later. 
Cumulating the growth effects, there is a negative effect on the level of domestic 
absorption after four years of over 2 percent, and this is statistically significant.  
 
The above results suggest that contractionary effects of devaluation on domestic 
absorption are partially offset by a conventional improvement in net exports, 
leading to a smaller contractionary effect on output itself. The relative size of the 
adjustment in exports versus imports can be examined by estimating the model 
with exports and the model with imports. As depicted in Figure 8, export growth 
expands by about 2 percentage points after a year in response to about the same-
                                                 
16 The expanded version of our paper—Ahmed, Ara, and Hyder (2005)—analyzes the historical 
decompositions of real exchange rate changes and domestic inflation as well.  
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size real exchange rate depreciation shock as above, but the initial growth 
response of exports is negative and subsequently it turns negative too, so there is 
only a very modest net positive effect on the level of exports over time, which is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 9 shows that there is a negative effect on imports, which is quite a bit 
bigger in magnitude than the positive overall export effect—after two years the 
level of imports is down by a little more than 3 percent (statistically significant). 
Thus, the conventional response of an improvement in the trade balance following 
real depreciation of the currency appears to be occurring largely through a 
compression of imports rather than an expansion of exports. 
 
Implications for exchange rate regime 
 
The shocks to the outputs of its major trading partners are not a very important 
source of fluctuations in Pakistan’s economic growth or inflation. This absence of 
common shocks suggests that there is not a good case for Pakistan fixing its 
currency to the dollar or to the currency of one of its other major trading partners 
on the basis of the traditional fixed-exchange rate arguments. 
 
The results also suggest that there might only be limited scope in the case of 
Pakistan to improve the credibility of anti-inflationary policies through fixing the 
exchange rate. Although there is a fairly large pass-through effect to prices from 
exchange rate depreciation shocks, such shocks do not explain much of the 
forecast error variance of inflation. Also, the credibility gains from fixing an 
exchange rate are maximized when free capital mobility is allowed, which forces a 
country to give up its independent monetary policy. But free capital mobility is not 
an appropriate assumption in the case of Pakistan. 
 
Moreover, external shocks in general do form a very important influence on 
Pakistan’s economy even if they are not in large part common shocks with 
important trading partners of the type that might lead to common business cycles. 
In particular, shocks to remittances are major determinants of the forecast error 
variance of Pakistan’s real GDP growth. There is also clear evidence that the 
importance of such shocks for Pakistan has increased since September 11, 2001. 
Some exchange rate flexibility might be a useful tool for Pakistan to deal with 
such shocks, with the exchange rate appreciating in response to positive shocks to 
remittances (which has happened to some degree in recent years) and depreciating 
in response to negative shocks. 
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Our empirical results also suggest that exchange rate flexibility can act as a 
stabilizing influence on the trade balance. We find a conventional improvement in 
net exports following real exchange rate depreciation, but in large part this is 
because imports fall and only in small part because exports improve. 
 
Thus far, there appears to be a case for allowing a substantial degree of flexibility 
in Pakistan’s exchange rate. But our results also indicate that Pakistan suffers from 
the typical developing country syndrome of real exchange rate depreciations 
having a contractionary effect on domestic demand. This effect appears to be large 
enough to more than offset the positive effect of currency depreciation on output 
coming from an improvement in net exports. Thus, on net, exchange rate 
flexibility may not help stabilize output, even if it stabilizes the trade balance. 
 
The negative effect on domestic demand of currency depreciation probably is a 
reflection of the special problems that Pakistan has historically shared with many 
developing countries—currency mismatches on domestic balance sheets resulting 
from an inability to borrow long term in domestic currency, “fickle and moody” 
international capital flows that are subject to sudden starts and stops, and lack of 
credibility and stability of domestic policies. The history of these problems, and 
the resulting implications, makes the case for substantial flexibility of exchange 
rates mixed. However, if the recent improvements in the stability and credibility of 
macroeconomic policies continue, this should bolster the case for a more flexible 
exchange rate regime going forward. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this study, we posed the following questions for Pakistan’s economy: How 
important are external shocks (terms of trade shocks, shocks to outputs/incomes of 
major trading partners, and foreign remittance shocks) in driving economic 
fluctuations? (2) Are exchange rate depreciations contractionary or expansionary? 
(3) What are the channels through which exchange rate changes affect the 
economy and how important is their effect relative to other factors? (4) What are 
the implications of the results for the choice of exchange rate regime?  We 
estimated a structural VAR using annual data over the period 1977 to 2005 and 
considered impulse responses, variance decompositions, and historical 
decompositions to address the above questions. Our empirical analysis suggests 
the following answers:  
 
First, with regard to the importance of external shocks, terms of trade shocks 
appear to have very little effect on Pakistan’s real exchange rate, domestic output, 
and domestic prices. Foreign output shocks lead to a real depreciation of the rupee 
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but their spillover effects on domestic output are rather modest. By contrast 
positive shocks to remittances from abroad lead subsequently to a significant 
increase in domestic output and a substantial real exchange rate appreciation, but 
very little response of the domestic price level. As a group, external shocks 
explain roughly about a fifth to half of the fluctuations of domestic output around 
baseline at a one- to two-year horizon; shocks to remittances alone explain about 
20 percent of the fluctuations of output at a two-year horizon. For inflation, 
external shocks as a group explain about 10-35 percent of the deviations around 
baseline. The importance of external shocks has increased post-September 11, 
2001; output growth in 2004 and 2005 would have been about 2½ percentage 
points less each in the absence of any remittance shocks after September 11. 
 
Second, real exchange rate depreciation shocks lead to a modest fall in domestic 
output, indicating that depreciations are contractionary rather than expansionary. 
The inflation rate rises indicating some pass-through effect on prices. Although 
the pass-through effect is fairly substantial in magnitude, it is not very precisely 
determined and thus statistically insignificant. 
 
Third, turning to the transmission mechanisms, net exports display a conventional 
positive response to a real exchange rate depreciation shock, largely driven by 
imports falling rather than exports rising. But the positive effect on net exports is 
more than offset by a contractionary effect on domestic absorption, which results 
in a net negative effect on overall output. Thus the channels of transmission are 
that real imports show a conventional fall following real currency depreciation, 
exports exhibit only a weak expansionary response, and domestic demand falls 
substantially. Likely, the fall in domestic demand is driven by the special 
problems of developing countries that have been highlighted in the literature, such 
as currency mismatches on domestic balance sheets, volatile international capital 
flows, and a historical record of lack of credibility of macroeconomic policies. 
 
Finally, the implications of the results for the choice of exchange rate regime are 
rather mixed. Several results point to a case against fixing the exchange rate: 
Pakistan does not share common shocks with its major trading partners and there 
is not much evidence that it would reap much gain in credibility of anti-
inflationary policy either from fixing. Moreover, remittance shocks cause fairly 
large fluctuations, which exchange rate flexibility would provide an appropriate 
adjustment mechanism to. In addition, it appears that exchange rate flexibility 
would help to stabilize external imbalances as well. But working against greater 
flexibility of the exchange rate is the substantial negative effects on domestic 
demand of currency depreciation, which more than offset the positive effect on net 
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exports. Thus, greater exchange rate flexibility may end up destabilizing rather 
than stabilizing aggregate output growth. 
 
In sum, a potential case for greater exchange rate flexibility and the ability of 
exchange rate changes to act as an appropriate adjustment mechanism to shocks 
exists in Pakistan. But it is tempered by typical problems of a developing country 
that lead to a (rational) “fear of floating.” With Pakistan’s macroeconomic policies 
becoming more stable over the past few years, it has had a bit more room to 
pursue countercyclical monetary policy and allow greater exchange rate flexibility 
perhaps. Other country experiences—such as Mexico’s since its currency crisis of 
1995—also show that, with improvement in policies and in the monetary 
framework, developing countries can graduate and the exchange rate can become 
a better adjustment tool. If the monetary framework and policies in Pakistan 
continue to mature, one would perhaps in time be able to give a more unqualified 
recommendation for a policy of greater exchange rate flexibility. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Variance Decomposition of the Growth of Real Effective Ex. Rate 
Percentage of the k-step ahead forecast error variance of growth of real effective exchange rate 
explained by 
External shocks Domestic shocks k 
(years) 
Terms of 
Trade shock
Foreign 
Output 
shock 
Remittanc
es shock 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate shock 
Domestic 
Output shock
Domestic 
Price (CPI) 
shock 
All External 
shocks 
All 
Domestic 
shocks 
1 4.3 7.1 7.4 81.3 0* 0* 18.7 81.3 
 (5.9) (7.8) (7.7) (11.3) - - (21.5) (11.3) 
2 8.8 16.5 16.0 53.0 3.3 2.4 41.3 58.7 
 (8.9) (11.9) (11.1) (13.7) (3.3) (3.4) (31.8) (20.4) 
3 10.0 31.2 16.0 37.1 2.4 3.3 57.2 42.8 
 (9.1) (13.9) (10.9) (11.6) (2.1) (3.5) (33.9) (17.2) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 “0*” indicates contribution constrained to be zero as a consequence of the identification assumptions. 
 
 
Table 2. Variance Decomposition of the Growth of Domestic Output 
Percentage of the k-step ahead forecast error variance of growth of domestic output  
explained by 
External shocks Domestic shocks k 
(years) 
Terms of 
Trade shock
Foreign 
Output 
shock 
Remittances 
shock 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate shock 
Domestic 
Output 
shock 
Domestic 
Price (CPI) 
shock 
All 
External 
shocks 
All 
Domestic 
shocks 
1 4.6 9.7 4.4 7.6 73.8 0* 18.6 81.4 
 (6.0) (9.5) (5.7) (7.5) (13.0) - (21.3) (20.5) 
2 7.3 11.4 6.8 23.4 45.9 5.2 25.5 74.5 
 (7.4) (9.2) (6.5) (10.4) (11.6) (5.8) (23.0) (27.8) 
3 8.3 15.9 19.9 11.1 19.0 25.7 44.2 55.8 
 (7.8) (10.9) (12.1) (6.0) (6.9) (11.0) (30.8) (24.0) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 “0*” indicates contribution constrained to be zero as a consequence of the identification assumptions. 
 
 
Table 3. Variance Decomposition of Domestic CPI Inflation 
Percentage of the k-step ahead forecast error variance of growth of CPI Inflation explained by 
External shocks Domestic shocks k 
(years) Terms of 
Trade shock
Foreign 
Output 
shock 
Remittances 
shock 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate shock 
Domestic 
Output 
shock 
Domestic 
Price (CPI) 
shock 
All 
External 
shocks 
All 
Domestic 
shocks 
1 5.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.2 80.8 12.0 88.0 
 (6.7) (4.5) (5.0) (5.2) (4.3) (10.6) (16.1) (20.1) 
2 12.9 7.6 8.5 4.5 3.2 63.4 28.9 71.1 
 (11.3) (7.7) (8.1) (5.1) (3.9) (13.3) (27.1) (22.3) 
3 15.0 10.1 9.8 7.2 3.4 54.5 34.9 65.1 
 (12.3) (9.3) (7.9) (6.6) (3.8) (14.0) (29.5) (24.5) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1: Plots of Fundamental Disturbances 
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Figure 2: Responses to a shock to Terms of Trade 
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Figure 3: Responses to a shock to Foreign Output 
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Figure 4: Responses to a shock to Workers’ Remittances 
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Figure 5: Responses to a shock to Real Effective Exchange Rate 
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Figure 6: Historical Decomposition of Growth of Domestic Output 
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Figure 7: Responses to a shock to Real Effective Exchange Rate (Absorption Model) 
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Figure 8: Responses to a shock to Real Effective Exchange Rate (Export Model) 
 
(in Growth Rates) 
R eal Ef f ect ive Exchang e R at e_ g ro w t h
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 1 2 3 4
Exp o r t s_ g ro w t h
 
C PI_ g ro w t h
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 1 2 3 4  
 
(in Levels) 
R eal Ef f ect ive Exchang e R at e_ Level
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 1 2 3 4  
Exp o r t s_ Level
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 1 2 3 4
 
CP I_ Lev e l
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 1 2 3 4
 
  
 
 SBP-Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006 88 
Figure 9: Responses to a shock to Real Effective Exchange Rate (Import Model) 
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